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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 














On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.:  2:17-cv-04476) 
District Judge:  Honorable Chad F. Kenney 
     
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 2, 2020 
(Filed:  August 18, 2020) 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 




Appellant Robert Gardner challenges two orders of the District Court, one 
granting a partial motion to dismiss certain of his ADA claims and another granting 
summary judgment for Appellee Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(SEPTA) on other claims.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case arises out of Gardner’s attempt to obtain disability accommodations 
from his employer, SEPTA.  Gardner began working for SEPTA in January 2014 as a bus 
operator.  On March 12, 2014, Gardner applied to transfer from his position as a bus 
operator to a position operating a rail trolley.  According to a collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) between the Transport Workers Union Local 234 City Transit Division 
(Local 234) and SEPTA, SEPTA was obligated to consider transfer requests like 
Gardner’s based on seniority.  As a bus operator, Gardner was a member of Local 234 
and covered by the CBA. 
In August 2014, Gardner experienced a non-work-related motor vehicle accident.  
As a result, he sought medical treatment, including neck and back surgery.  On June 4, 
2015, while operating a SEPTA bus, Gardner was involved in a work-related accident.  
Gardner claims that this accident exacerbated his existing injuries. 
Gardner reported to SEPTA that he suffered work-related injuries from the 
accident and made a workers’ compensation claim for related medical treatment.  On July 
28, Dr. Lawrence Axelrod, SEPTA’s workers’ compensation physician, evaluated 




at Gardner’s request, specified that Gardner could operate rail vehicles but not buses.1  
Based on Dr. Axelrod’s report, on July 31, 2015, SEPTA assigned Gardner to a 
temporary, light-duty position.  
On August 5, 2015, Gardner’s personal physician, Dr. Mark Allen, prepared a 
document that stated Gardner was “capable of driving a trolley car only.”  App. 441.  
When Gardner again met with Dr. Axelrod on August 11, 2015, Axelrod reported that 
Gardner gave him the August 5 form signed by Allen, and asked Axelrod to identically 
reproduce the restrictions Allen had identified. 
On September 2, 2015, Gardner submitted a request for accommodation under the 
ADA.  He claimed that, due to the injuries he sustained in the June 4 bus accident, which 
caused limitations on his ability to perform arm and hand motions, he was disabled and 
required accommodation.  He specifically sought transfer to a trolley operator position, 
which he believed would cause less physical stress.  In support of the request, Gardner 
submitted a “Physical Capacities Form,” App. 440, from Dr. Allen noting arm and hand 
limitations and the document indicating that he was “capable of driving a trolley car 
only,” App. 441.  At that time, Gardner was number 35 of 37 on the seniority list for 
transfers to trolley operator positions. 
 
1 Dr. Axelrod observed in his notes that, given Gardner’s prior request for a transfer to 
operating rail vehicles, Axelrod “felt compelled to consider the possibility that Mr. 
Gardner was displaying intentional manipulative type behaviors.”  App. 422.  In a 
subsequent visit on August 11, Axelrod specifically informed Gardner that he “could not 
discern any significant difference in the physical capabilities” for operating rail vehicles 
versus buses, but Gardner “repeated his requests/demands that [Axelrod] disqualify him 





On September 4, 2015, Jacqueline Hopkins, an ADA compliance consultant in 
SEPTA’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) department, spoke with Gardner by 
phone about his request.  Gardner followed up with an email, in which he reiterated his 
desire to be transferred to a trolley operator position and asked SEPTA to make an 
exception to the seniority requirements, which he believed SEPTA had done in the past.  
Hopkins responded that the transfer process is governed by the CBA and separate from 
the process of identifying an appropriate accommodation. 
On September 17, Gardner submitted a note from Dr. Allen dated September 16.  
The note stated that “Mr. Gardner is cleared to return to full duties a[t] work.”  App. 492.  
On September 24, Hopkins wrote to Gardner, seeking clarification about the differing 
opinions from Dr. Allen.  In response, Gardner submitted two Physical Capacities Forms 
from Dr. Allen and a Dr. Soto, both identifying the same restrictions noted in the 
documents attached to Gardner’s original request.  On September 30, Gardner submitted 
another report from Dr. Allen that said Gardner’s condition was “[u]nchanged.”  App. 
497–98.  That report was dated September 16—the same date as the note that said 
Gardner could return to full duties.   
On September 29 and 30, while SEPTA was considering the accommodation 
request, Gardner submitted Operator’s Accident/Incident Reports, which asserted that he 
could not operate a bus safely because of his disabilities.  In response to the Incident 
Reports, Gardner was put on sick leave on September 30 because his representations 




The Assistant Director for SEPTA’s Southern District told Gardner he could return if he 
provided the required medical clearance.   
On October 1, 2015, Hopkins wrote to Gardner to acknowledge receipt of 
materials he sent on September 30 and to invite him to meet with her in person along 
with SEPTA Medical Director Dr. Jeffery Erinoff and Director of EEO/AA and 
Employee Relations Lorraine McKenzie.  On the same day, Gardner filed a charge of 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC).  SEPTA did not receive notice of 
that charge until November 16.2  On October 5, Gardner filed a grievance against SEPTA 
through Local 234, protesting the failure to grant him the requested accommodation.  In 
emails with SEPTA, however, it became clear that there were conflicting views within 
the union about circumventing the CBA to allow the requested transfer, with the 
President of Local 234 opposing such an action. 
On October 7, Gardner met with Hopkins, Erinoff, and McKenzie.  At that 
meeting, according to Gardner, Hopkins indicated that SEPTA would not be prepared to 
grant his request until he appeared for an independent medical evaluation (IME) 
scheduled by SEPTA’s Workers’ Compensation Department.  On October 28, Hopkins 
 
2 In December 2015, the EEOC responded to Gardner’s October 2015 charge, which had 
alleged discrimination and retaliation for seeking accommodation for his arm and hand 
disability.  The letter requested any additional information to support the investigation 
and to rebut SEPTA’s response to the initial charge.  Gardner responded seeking a 
continued investigation and mentioned issues with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 






wrote to Gardner, expressing SEPTA’s intent to rely on the results of the IME in 
connection with his pending workers’ compensation claim but noting that SEPTA would 
continue to explore reassignment options.  The IME occurred on October 21, and the 
evaluating physician, Dr. Dennis McHugh, concluded “within a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, that Mr. Gardner is fully recovered . . . and that he needs no further 
care. . . .  Mr. Gardner could return to full duty work without restrictions as a SEPTA bus 
driver immediately.”  App. 556–57.  On November 19, 2015, SEPTA’s Vocational 
Consultant informed Gardner that, due to the IME results, he could return to work subject 
to a medical fitness-for-duty examination.  On December 3, 2015, Hopkins notified 
Gardner that SEPTA was denying his request for accommodation. 
On January 27, 2016, Gardner again submitted an ADA accommodation request, 
claiming the same limitations as in the September 2, 2015 request and seeking the same 
accommodation.  He provided a November 2015 shoulder MRI result, a December 2015 
cervical MRI result, two December 2015 reports from Dr. Allen, and a January 27, 2016 
note from Dr. Allen, which stated, “Mr. Gardner is cleared to return to work operating 
trollies only.  Not as a bus driver.”  App. 573.  On February 10, 2016, SEPTA again 
received a note from Dr. Allen indicating that Gardner was “[c]leared to return to normal 
duties.”  App. 575.  On February 22, 2016, Hopkins informed Gardner that his 
accommodation request was denied. 
Appellant Gardner filed his Complaint against SEPTA in federal court on October 
10, 2017, alleging claims of disability discrimination, disability harassment, and 




details about PTSD, depression, photophobia, and sensitivity to light.  On March 29, 
2018, SEPTA filed a Rule 12(b)(6) partial motion to dismiss the PTSD-related claims for 
failure to administratively exhaust them.  On August 22, the District Court, Judge 
Goldberg, granted the motion.3 
After answering the Complaint and conducting discovery, SEPTA filed a motion 
for summary judgment on August 16, 2019.  The District Court—now Judge Kenney—
granted the motion on October 17, finding that Gardner failed to make out a prima facie 
case of disability discrimination, that SEPTA satisfied its obligation to engage in an 
interactive process with Gardner, and that Gardner did not make out a prima facie case of 
retaliation.  Gardner now appeals both the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment 
for SEPTA and its earlier decision to grant the partial motion to dismiss. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW  
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the District Court’s 
decisions to grant the motion to dismiss and to grant summary judgment.  Cranbury Brick 
Yard, LLC v. United States, 943 F.3d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 2019); DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 
262, 272 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Gardner challenges the District Court’s decisions to grant the motion to dismiss 
with respect to his PTSD-related claims and to grant summary judgment on his disability 
 
3 On November 26, 2018, this case was reassigned from Judge Goldberg to Judge 




discrimination claims and his retaliation claim.  For the following reasons, we will affirm 
both decisions.  
A. Motion to Dismiss 
Before filing a complaint for employment discrimination under the ADA, a 
plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies by presenting the allegations in a timely 
administrative charge to the EEOC.  Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 
1999).  In determining whether the allegations in a complaint have been properly 
exhausted, courts consider “whether the acts alleged . . . are fairly within the scope of the 
prior EEOC complaint, or the investigation arising therefrom.”  Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 
1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam)).  Where facts alleged in a complaint fall outside the core grievance 
addressed in the EEOC charge, the new claim is distinct and has not been 
administratively exhausted.  See id. at 1295–96.  
Here, the District Court correctly determined that Gardner’s PTSD-related 
claims did not arise from the same core grievance discussed in the EEOC charge.  
Indeed, Gardner never mentioned the PTSD-related allegations in his initial 
charge, nor has he asserted that they are factually related to the incidents 
concerning his claimed arm and hand disabilities.  In fact, the events underlying 
his PTSD-related allegations are entirely distinct from his other claims, as they 
arose at different times and involved different SEPTA employees.  They were thus 




The District Court also rightly concluded that the brief mention of PTSD in 
Gardner’s counsel’s letter responding to the EEOC’s request for more information 
was insufficient to compensate for the failure to make those allegations in the 
charge.  An EEOC charge may only be amended to “cure technical defects or 
omissions . . . or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.12(b).  Any additional acts included by amendment must be “related to or 
growing out of the subject matter of the original charge.”  Id.  Gardner’s PTSD-
related claims are not sufficiently related to his claims of arm and hand 
impairments to be considered an amendment to Gardner’s original charge. 
Because the PTSD-related claims did not arise out of the same grievance 
raised in the original charge and were not reasonably related to that charge, they 
were not properly exhausted.  See Hicks v. ABT Assocs. Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 967 
(3d Cir. 1978).  We therefore will affirm the District Court’s decision to grant the 
partial motion to dismiss.  
B. Motion for Summary Judgment 
In evaluating SEPTA’s motion for summary judgment, we must determine 
whether any genuine dispute of material fact exists, and if not, we must decide whether, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, SEPTA was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–




a. Discrimination Claims 
SEPTA argues that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in its 
favor on the discrimination claims because Gardner failed to make out a prima facie case 
of discrimination under the ADA.  To establish a prima facie case, Gardner was obligated 
to show: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise 
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodations . . . ; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision 
as a result of discrimination.”  Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).  The PHRA requires the same analysis.4  
The District Court concluded that Gardner failed to meet even the first prong.  
Under the ADA, one has a disability if he has “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i).  The District Court found that Gardner failed to establish a 
disability because he offered no “specific reference to a major life activity that [his] 
disability limits,” and “the only activity [Gardner] claims is limited is his ability to work 
as a bus operator.”  App. 36.  The District Court thus concluded that Gardner’s claimed 
arm and hand problems did not substantially limit his ability to work.  We are not so sure.  
 
4 The 2008 Amendments to the ADA clarified that whether an impairment is a disability 
“should not demand extensive analysis” and that “disability” “shall be construed broadly 
in favor of expansive coverage of” individuals.  28 C.F.R. § 36.101(b).  The PHRA 
disability analysis, although otherwise parallel to the ADA analysis, does not demand 
such broad construction in favor of coverage.  Because the District Court here found that 
Gardner failed to meet the ADA definition of disability, it found that he necessarily could 




While one could conclude that Gardner’s injuries did not constitute a substantial 
limitation, one might also conclude that they did, given the conflicting characterizations 
of Gardner’s physical abilities by various medical professionals and the broad 
construction courts are obligated to give the term “disability.”  See 28 C.F.R. § 36.101(b).  
However, we need not resolve this issue because—even assuming Gardner was disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA—the District Court rightly determined that he has not 
shown he is a qualified individual under the second prong. 
Under the ADA, a “qualified individual” is someone “who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position” sought.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306.  Here, Gardner’s 
requested accommodation of transfer to a trolley operator position was not a reasonable 
accommodation.  At the time of his request, Gardner lacked the seniority for an internal 
transfer to a trolley operator role under the CBA, so his requested accommodation would 
have required that SEPTA violate the CBA.  The ADA “does not require that collectively 
bargained seniority rights be compromised in order to reasonably accommodate a 
disabled individual.”  Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 82 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).  
Accordingly, the seniority requirement applied and precluded Gardner from being 
eligible for the transfer he sought.  
To bypass the seniority provision of the CBA, Gardner would have needed a 
waiver from the union.  See id. at 83 (“[I]t is appropriate for the union, rather than the 
employer, to make the determination that the infringement is justifiable by releasing the 




bargaining agreement to accommodate a qualified individual with a disability.”).  The 
record indicates, however, that the Local 234 President opposed the transfer.  Although 
Gardner points out that some members supported his transfer, such support does not 
amount to the union’s formal waiver of the seniority requirement of the CBA.  Thus, the 
seniority requirement continued to apply, and the requested accommodation was not 
reasonable.  We therefore cannot find fault with the District Court’s determination that 
Gardner was not a qualified individual under the ADA. 
Relatedly, the District Court correctly determined that, even assuming Gardner 
was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, SEPTA fulfilled its obligation 
to engage in an “interactive process.”  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 
317.  To prove otherwise, Gardner had to show that:  (1) SEPTA knew he was disabled; 
(2) Gardner requested accommodations; (3) SEPTA made no “good faith effort to assist 
[Gardner] in seeking accommodations”; and (4) Gardner “could have been reasonably 
accommodated but for [SEPTA’s] lack of good faith.”  Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319–20.  
Here, the record provides ample evidence of a good faith effort on SEPTA’s part to assist 
Gardner.  Hopkins discussed Gardner’s request for a transfer with him by phone, by 
email, and in person.  She explored the seniority issue, looking into how long Gardner 
would have to wait to be eligible for the position he sought and engaging with Local 234 
to learn about the union’s position on the requested transfer.  When evaluating Gardner’s 
request, SEPTA considered all of Gardner’s documentation, seeking clarification when 
conflicting information arose.  Even after deciding to rely on the IME, SEPTA continued 




District Court that no reasonable juror could find that SEPTA failed to engage in the 
requisite interactive process. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment for SEPTA on the disability discrimination claims.   
b. Retaliation 
Gardner argues SEPTA retaliated against him for requesting accommodations by 
putting him on sick leave and refusing his second request for accommodation in January 
2016.  To establish a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) protected employee 
activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the 
employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s 
protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.”  Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 
F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Here, Gardner failed to establish the third prong.  Gardner’s contention that there 
is a causal connection between his protected activity and SEPTA’s allegedly adverse 
action is temporally implausible.  As the District Court noted, “SEPTA placed [Gardner] 
on sick leave before [he] filed his administrative complaint.”  App. 58 (emphasis added).5  
Further, SEPTA was obligated under the CBA to put Gardner on sick leave due to his 
representations that his injuries prevented him from working, eliminating any suggestion 
that the action was prompted by Gardner’s protected conduct.  To the extent that 
 
5 This also precludes a finding that the placement of Gardner on sick leave constituted an 
adverse action in retaliation for his EEOC charge under the second prong.  Krouse, 126 




Gardner’s retaliation claim is based on SEPTA’s denial of the requested transfer, we 
likewise agree with the District Court that the retaliation claim is simply an improper 
repackaging of Gardner’s claim that SEPTA failed to accommodate him.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment for SEPTA on 
the retaliation claim.    
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders. 
